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1. Introduction 
Over the last twenty years, significant changes have occurred in the institutional and 
macroeconomic framework that central banks operate. In particular, there has been a widespread 
move towards financial liberalization, both within and across national borders, especially after 
the 1980s, while inflation rates have become lower and less variable. The disinflation process of 
the 1990s has been a global phenomenon since it is observed both in countries where formal 
inflation targets are in use, and in non-targeting countries1. The decline in inflation has gone hand 
in hand with a similar decline in interest rates. In many countries, both short term and long term 
interest rates are close to, or even bellow, post-war lows. As Bean (2003) argues, price stability 
has not been achieved at the expense of the real economy, as unemployment has been decreasing 
in a number of countries, while growth has also been relatively stable. Despite the good 
macroeconomic record of the past decade, there has been a growing concern among academics 
and policymakers that the achievement of price stability may be associated with an increased risk 
of financial instability.  
Some commentators claim that the lower cost of capital along with exuberant growth 
projections have boosted the late 1990s stock market bubble. For instance, Borio and Lowe 
(2002) argue that booms and busts in asset prices should be considered as part of a broader set of 
symptoms that typically also include a build-up of debt and high rate of capital accumulation.   
Rising asset prices and debt accumulation lead to stretched household and corporate balance 
sheets, vulnerable to sharp corrections of the type witnessed recently in global equity markets. In 
a series of articles, Goodhart and Hofmann (2000, 2003) establish empirically the link between 
output growth, credit aggregates, and asset price movements in a number of major economies. 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) develop a theoretical model that exhibits a crucial interaction 
between collateral values, asset prices, credit and economic activity. During the period of boom, 
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balance sheets may look healthy as the increase in asset prices, and consequently the value of the 
collateral, offsets the build-up of debt. However, when optimism about further increases in asset 
values turns to pessimism, leading to a decrease in the net worth of households and firms, then 
financial distress may be the result of financial imbalances unwinding. It has been argued that the 
widespread financial deregulation of asset markets may have contributed to an increase in the 
frequency of such boom-bust episodes (IMF, 2003).  
An important issue related to the above concerns is the establishment of the appropriate 
monetary policy response to asset price movements. Should the central bank care about the 
financial instability associated with large asset price fluctuations? Nowadays, everyone 
recognizes price level stability as the primary objective of monetary policy. Indeed, as Issing 
(2003) emphasizes, price stability and financial stability tend to mutually reinforce each other in 
the long run. However, as the examples of the US in the 1920s and 1990s and Japan in the late 
1980s demonstrate, financial imbalances may build up even in an environment of stable prices 
(Borio and Lowe, 2002). Exponents of the ‘new environment’ hypothesis argue that low and 
stable rates of inflation may even foster asset price bubbles, due e.g. to excessively optimistic 
expectations about future economic development. Thus, price stability is not a sufficient 
condition for financial stability. Among the exponents of the new environment hypothesis, 
Crocket (2003) claims that: “...if the monetary policy reaction function does not incorporate 
financial imbalances, the monetary anchor may fail to deliver financial stability”. The current 
consensus however, stresses that monetary policy should be directed exclusively at achieving 
price stability, and its role in promoting financial stability should be restricted to restricted to 
minimising the negative effects from bubbles bursting and financial imbalances unwinding2.  
                                                                                                                                                              
1
 See e.g. Johnson (2002) for international evidence. 
2
 For instance, Alan Greenspan (2002) argues that: “The notion that a well-timed incremental tightening could have 
been calibrated to prevent the late 1990s bubble is almost surely an illusion. Instead, we...need to focus on policies to 
mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion.” 
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A number of studies have tried to provide an answer to the question of whether monetary 
policy should respond to asset prices, by simulating macroeconomic models where aggregate 
demand is affected by consumption wealth effects and/or investment balance sheet effects. The 
simulation evidence of Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) opts for a reactive monetary policy 
response since they show that a central bank dedicated to price stability should pay no attention 
to asset prices per se, except insofar as they signal changes to expected inflation (see also 
Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002). On the other hand, Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani 
(2000), and Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2003) find that, in line with the new environment 
proactive view, overall macroeconomic volatility can be reduced with a (mild) reaction of 
interest rates to asset price misalignments from fundamentals. Also, recent econometric evidence 
by Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2003) for the UK, and Chadha, Sarno and Valente (2003) for 
UK, US and Japan, suggests that monetary policymakers may use asset prices not only as part of 
their information set for setting interest rates, but also as elements in their reaction function. 
All the aforementioned papers use the assumption that monetary policy is characterised 
by an augmented Taylor rule, where the nominal interest rate responds positively to inflation, 
demand pressures, and asset prices. Following the seminal work by Taylor (1993), feedback rules 
conditioning the interest rate instrument on current or expected inflation and the output gap have 
been extensively analysed in both theoretical and empirical literature. Svensson (1997), Clark, 
Goodhart and Huang (1999) among others, show that such a feedback rule is optimal in that it 
derives from the first order condition for the optimisation of the central bank’s objectives3. In this 
paper, we try to shed some more light in the relationship between monetary policy and asset 
prices in the context of optimal policy rules. In essence, we will examine whether there is any 
                                                 
3
 One should keep in mind though, that simple instrument rules like the Taylor rule and its variants may not 
correspond to fully optimal policy in the context of a particular economic model (see e.g. Woodford, 2001). Also, as 
Svensson, (2003) argues, no central bank has so far made a commitment to a simple instrument rule like the Taylor 
rule or variants thereof. In addition, neither has any central bank announced a particular instrument rule as a 
guideline. 
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underlying theoretical motivation for the increasingly frequent assumption of an augmented (for 
asset prices) Taylor rule. To do so, we start from a backward-looking structural macro model 
where asset prices affect future inflation indirectly, through direct wealth effects on aggregate 
demand. In our model, market inefficiency implies that asset prices may deviate from their 
fundamental value due to ‘momentum’ effects from past asset price changes 
The optimality conditions suggest that monetary policy should respond to asset price 
misalignments from their fundamental value, with the aggressiveness of the response being a 
positive function of the impact of asset prices on aggregate demand. This result has important 
implications for the conduct of monetary policy and contributes crucially to the existing 
literature, as previous work on optimal rules considering asset prices, either fails to find a role for 
asset prices (Bean, 2003), or obtains complex, non linear rules (Bordo and Jeanne, 2002). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical 
model that will be employed, while section  2.1 focuses on the asset price block of the model and 
provides econometric evidence to support the chosen specification. In section 2.2 the model is 
solved, and in section 3 we calculate the optimal interest rate rule based upon dynamic 
optimization of the central bank’s objectives. In section 3.1 we analyze the results with a special 
interest on the interaction between the magnitude of wealth effects and the interest rate reaction 
coefficients. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The model  
We use a structural backward-looking model of a (closed) economy that allows for the 
effect of asset prices on aggregate demand. The model augments the standard macroeconomic 
system (aggregate demand, aggregate supply) by taking into account asset prices, which 
themselves are assumed to stochastically evolve influenced by both fundamentals and 
momentum.   The model is given by the following equations: 
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1 1 1t t t taypi pi ε+ + += + +  (1) 
1 1 2 1 3 1( [ ])t t t t t t ty y i E qβ β pi β η+ + += − − + +  (2) 
*
1t t tq q b q −= + ∆  (3) 
*
1 1 2 1( [ ]) [ ]t t t t t t tq i E E y uδ pi δ+ += − − + +  (4) 
 
where yt is the deviation of (log) output from its steady-state level (output gap), 1t t tp ppi −= −  is 
the inflation rate (strictly, the deviation from target), pt is (log) price level, it is the monetary 
policy instrument (one-period nominal interest rate), qt  denotes (log) real asset prices and qt* the 
fundamentals. Different interpretations of qt are possible (e.g. house prices, stock prices or the 
value of a portfolio containing both housing and equity investment), in what follows though we 
mainly treat it is an equity index. tη , tε , tu  represent exogenous random shocks to aggregate 
demand, inflation, and asset price fundamentals. For simplicity, we assume that they are mutually 
uncorrelated i.i.d. processes with zero means and constant variances. The structural parameters 
can be interpreted as partial elasticities with the following properties:  0 < 1β  <1;  a , 2β , 1δ ,    
2δ , > 0; 3β   0, 0 ≤. b <1. 
Eq. (1) is an accelerationist (or backward-looking NAIRU type) Phillips Curve where the 
change in inflation is a positive function of the current output gap and the inflation shock. The 
presence of inflation inertia in the inflation equation implies that disinflations will be costly in 
terms of output losses, thus there is a short-run trade-off between inflation and the output. 
However, since lagged inflation enters Eq. (1) with unity coefficient, this specification implies a 
vertical long-run Phillips curve. Eq. (1) posits no role for expected future inflation in the inflation 
adjustment equation4. Fuhrer (1997) employed US inflation data and argued that forward looking 
                                                 
4
 Similar specification has been used by Svensson (1997) and Rudesbusch and Svensson (1999), with the difference 
that their model exhibits a two-periods control lag for inflation. Rudebusch (2002) considers the hybrid Phillips 
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expectations are unimportant empirically. The parameter  is a positive constant which measures 
the sensitivity of inflation to excess demand5. 
The demand side, as given by Eq. (2), is consistent with the specification employed by 
Walsh (1998), Ball (1997), and Svensson (1997), with one important difference: aggregate 
demand depends positively on the past level of asset prices via consumption wealth effects and 
investment balance sheet effects. For example, a persistent increase in the level of asset prices 
decreases the perceived level of households’ financial distress causing a boost in consumption 
spending. The balance sheet channel implies a positive relationship between the firms’ ability to 
borrow and their net worth which in turn depends on asset valuations.  There is a vast amount of 
empirical evidence indicating that stock and house price movements are strongly correlated with 
aggregate demand in most major economies6. Parameter 3 in the aggregate demand is of crucial 
interest since it indicates the magnitude of wealth effects. If there are no wealth effects then       
3 = 0 and Eq. (2) resembles a traditional dynamic IS curve. In our model, the central bank takes 
into account the effect of wealth on aggregate demand, that is, it is fully aware of the effect of qt 
on yt+1 and its magnitude.  
 
2.1       Asset price dynamics 
Apart from augmenting aggregate demand to account for the effect of asset prices, our 
own contribution is to append Eqs. (3) and (4) to the standard model, representing the dynamic 
evolution of asset prices, qt, and their underlying fundamentals, qt*, respectively. In order to 
depict actual financial market behavior, Eq. (3) indicates that observed asset prices are not always 
equal to their fundamental value. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) postulates that all 
                                                                                                                                                              
curve: 
1 1 1 1(1 ) [ ]t t t t t tE aypi pipi µ pi µ pi ε+ + + += + − + + , and points out that the accelerationist Phillips curve (  1) can be 
derived from well-known models of price-setting behavior (see e.g. Roberts, 1995).  
5
 As Clark, Goodhart, and Huang (1999) point out, there are good reasons to believe that  is not constant. However,  
the assumption of linearity in the Phillips curve helps to obtain a closed-form solution for the optimal feedback rule.  
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information required to determine the intrinsic asset value will, by actions of rational profit-
maximizing agents, be reflected in the actual market price; hence b = 0 and qt = qt*. In the 
context of the EMH, the asset price changes if and only if the market receives new information 
about the asset’s underlying economic fundamentals, and the actions of speculators are 
stabilising, in that they drive the actual asset price towards its fundamental value rather than away 
from it (e.g. by buying underpriced assets and selling overpriced ones).   
However, the central tenets of the EMH, that future prices are not affected by past 
movements in the asset price and that speculation can only have a stabilizing effect have never 
been quite accepted by market participants. As Kortian (1995) argues, there are several aspects of 
modern asset markets trading, which are clearly contrary to the sort of behavior implied by the 
EMH. For instance, the widespread use of technical analysis, that tries to use past asset price 
movements to predict future prices. Also, the frequent employment of stop-loss orders (selling 
orders which are activated once the asset price has fallen by a particular pre-determined amount), 
and the development of dynamic hedging strategies, such as portfolio insurance, according to 
which, investors buy in a rising market and sell into a falling one. All the aforementioned 
strategies, base investment decisions upon past price movements and agree with the view that 
investors from time-to-time act in a destabilizing manner. Economic history also provides plenty 
examples of destabilizing investor behavior with significant implications for asset prices and 
aggregate economic activity beginning as early as the seventeenth century7.   
Incorporating these arguments in our analysis, Eq. (3) indicates that, if asset prices have 
increased in the past (qt-1 > 0) there is a positive ‘momentum’ effect on their current level        
(b > 0). In essence, investors bid up the demand for asset holdings in expectation that past capital 
gains will persist in the future. The higher the value of b, the stronger the effect from past asset 
                                                                                                                                                              
6
 See among others, Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2003) for relevant empirical evidence considering the UK 
economy. 
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price changes and therefore qt can diverge significantly from its fundamental value, qt*, albeit not 
permanently8. But once asset prices revert, at an unknown future date, the downward effect on 
aggregate demand could be large. Eq. (3) is essentially a backward-looking version of the Frenkel 
and Mussa (1985) asset price equation9. Stability of the asset price path requires that the 
parameter b satisfies: 0 < b <1.  Eq. (4) describes fundamental asset prices in line with the 
standard dividend model of asset pricing. There is a positive effect from expected future 
dividends (assumed to depend on expected output) and a negative effect from real interest rates. 
This is supported by the majority of empirical studies examining the effect of macroeconomic 
variables on the stock market10. We also allow for uncertainty in the fundamentals’ process by 
including the random disturbance term, ut.  
 In order to gain some further insight on the suitability and empirical validity of the asset 
price block of our model, we substituted Eq. (4) in Eq. (3) and took 1st differences to obtain an 
econometrically estimatable expression: 
2
1 1 2 1 1( [ ]) [ ]t t t t t t t tq i E E y b qδ pi δ ξ+ + −∆ = − ∆ − + ∆ + ∆ +  (3) 
where ξt = ∆ut 
 Eq. (3) implies that real asset returns are negatively related to changes in the real interest 
rate, and positively affected by (upward) revisions in output expectations, and past asset returns. 
Eq. (3) will be estimated using quarterly data for the United Kingdom and the United States over 
                                                                                                                                                              
7
 See Garber (2000) for a discussion on the tulip mania in the early seventeenth century as well as other famous 
bubbles. 
8
 We do not regard the divergence of qt  from qt* as an explicit bubble because we do not assign any probabilistic 
structure to its evolution.  
9
 Frenkel and Mussa (1985) argue that a wide range of structural models for exchange rate determination can be 
subsumed under the reduced form asset price expression: * 1[ ]t t t tq q bE q += + ∆ .  
10
 See among others Fama (1981), Conover Jensen and Johnson (1999). 
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the period 1966-2002, 1958-2002, respectively11. To do so, expected future inflation and output 
are replaced with their ex post actual values, leading to Eq. (3.1): 
2 '
1 1 2 1 1( )t t t t t tq i y b qδ pi δ ξ+ + −∆ = − ∆ − + ∆ + ∆ +                     (3.1)  
The set of orthogonality conditions implied by Eq. (3.1)) is: 
2
1 1 2 1 1( ) 0t t t t t t tE q i y b qδ pi δ+ + − ∆ + ∆ − − ∆ − ∆ Ζ =   
where Zt is a vector of instruments, that is, lagged variables that help to forecast the change in 
inflation and output, and contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with the exogenous 
asset returns shock, ξt.   
 The Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation results in Table 1 used as 
instruments: a constant and six lags of the change in: nominal short-term interest rates, inflation, 
output gap, and real stock prices. Since the number of instruments is greater than the number of 
elements of the parameter vector [δ1, δ2, b], we test for the validity of the over-identifying 
restrictions using Hansen’s  J-statistic. 
     [Table 1 about here] 
The results indicate that, contrary to the EMH, real returns are not only affected by 
economic fundamentals, but also from their past history since the b coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in both UK and USA. The b coefficient obtains values in 
the range (0,1) ensuring that the dynamic stability criterion in Eq. (3) is satisfied. There is also a 
negative effect from a monetary policy tightening (-δ1 = -0.024, -0.016 in UK, USA) and a strong 
positive effect from higher output (δ2 = 1,39, 1.54 in UK, USA). Finally, the J-statistics indicate 
that the over-identifying restrictions are not rejected. 
 
                                                 
11
 Inflation was calculated as the log change of the GDP deflator; output gap was proxied by the deviation of real 
GDP from a Hodrick-Prescott trend; UK, USA real stock returns were calculated as the log change of the FTSE All 
Shares and Dow Jones, respectively; nominal short term interest rate was proxied by the 3 month Treasury Bill rate. 
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2.2  Solution of the model 
The structure of our model implies that monetary policy affects the stock market 
contemporaneously, and inflation and output with one period lag. At time t, the central bank 
chooses it which affects concurrent real asset prices and next period’s inflation and output gap, 
while contemporaneous inflation and output gap
 
are predetermined by previous decisions and 
current exogenous shocks.  
Substituting for fundamentals, *tq , in Eq. (3) we get an alternative expression for real 
asset prices: 
1 1 1 2 1( [ ]) [ ]t t t t t t t tq b q i E E y uδ pi δ− + += ∆ − − + +        (5) 
We then use Eq. (5) and the expectational version of Eq. (1) to eliminate qt, 1[ ]t tE pi +  from the 
aggregate demand Eq. (2): 
[ ]1 1 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 2 1 3 1 1( )( ) ( ) [ ]t t t t t t t ty y i a E y b q vβ β δ β pi β δ β β δ β+ + − += − + − + + + + ∆ +     (6) 
where 1 3 1t t tv uβ η+ += +  
Taking expectations on both sides of the above expression, conditional upon time t information, 
yields the following expression for 1[ ]t tE y + : 
1 1 2 3 1[ ] ( )t t t t t tE y y i b qλ λ pi λ+ −= − − + ∆         (7) 
where [ ]
1
1
3 1 2 3 21 ( )a
βλ β δ β β δ= − + + , [ ]
3 1 2
2
3 1 2 3 2
  
1 ( )a
β δ βλ β δ β β δ
+
=
− + +
, [ ]
3
3
3 1 2 3 2
 
1 ( )a
βλ β δ β β δ= − + +  
Using Eq. (7) to eliminate 1[ ]t tE y +  from Eq. (6) and rearranging, gives: 
1 1 2 3 1 1( )t t t t t ty y i b q vλ λ pi λ+ − += − − + ∆ +        (8) 
We define t as the control variable of the central bank), since t , yt  are predetermined 
when it is chosen. 
1 2 3 1( )t t t t ty i b qϕ λ λ pi λ −= − − + ∆                   (9) 
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Thus, the original system of equations (1-4) can be written compactly in terms of t as: 
1 1t t t tapi pi ϕ ω+ += + +           (1)’  
1 1t t ty vϕ+ += +            (2)’ 
where 1 1 1t t tavω ε+ + += +  
3.  Optimal interest rate rule 
 The central bank objective is to solve the following stochastic control problem: choose an 
infinite sequence of controls, t, to minimise the expected discounted value of the intertemporal 
quadratic loss function that penalizes both inflation and output gap volatility: 
 
0
2 21
2{ } 1
min [ ]
t t
i
t t i t i
i
E y
ϕ
β pi µ
∞
=
∞
+ +
=
+                         (10) 
subject to the transition Eqs. (1) and (2) 
where   0 is the relative weight attached by the central bank on output stabilisation.  is the 
discount factor, 0 <  <1. In the absence of discounting, the postulated loss function is a weighted 
average of conditional volatility of inflation and output. It is evident from (2) that at time t, when 
the interest rate (and consequently t) is chosen the only state variable is t. Therefore, the value 
function is defined in terms of t only, V(t). Applying Bellman’s dynamic programming 
principle, and substituting for the two constraints (1) and (2) in the value function, we obtain: 
2 21
1 1 12( ) min { [( ) ( ) ] ( )}
t
t t t t t t t t t tV E a v V aϕpi pi ϕ ω µ ϕ β pi ϕ ω+ + += + + + + + + +    (11) 
The first order condition with respect to tϕ  and the envelope theorem allow to derive an 
expression for the optimal path of the control variable 12: 
12 2 [ ]t t t t
a E
a a
µβϕ pi ϕ
µ µ +
   
= − + 	  	+ +
  
 
                 (12) 
                                                 
12
 See Appendix A.1 for more details. 
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Since we have a linear-quadratic structure in the stochastic control problem the solution will be of 
the form: 
t tcϕ pi=                      (13) 
Thus the optimal control will be linear function of the state variable (see Walsh, 1998). Updating 
one period ahead and taking expectations at time t of Eq. (13) yields: 
1[ ] (1 )t t tE caϕ ϕ+ = +                   (14) 
Substitution of Eqs. (13), (14) in Eq. (12) yields the following quadratic equation, whose solution 
gives the optimal c value: 
2 2( ) ( ) 0a c a c aµβ µβ µ+ − − − =                 (15) 
The solution that we accept should satisfy the inflation process stability criterion. This condition 
implies that only the negative c-root is accepted13. Finally, we manage to obtain the optimal path 
for the interest rate using Eqs. (9) and (13), substituting for 1λ , 2λ , 3λ , and re-arranging. 
[ ] 31
1
3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2
1
1t t t t
c A bi y qββpiβ δ β β δ β β δ β −
 −    
= − + + ∆ 	  	  	
+ + +
  
 
 
     (16) 
where 3 1 2 3 2( )A a β δ β β δ= + +  
Hence, the nominal interest rate reacts to the current output gap, current consumer price inflation, 
and past asset price inflation. Eq. (16) can be transformed into a more intuitive expression by 
recalling that, according to Eq. (3), the deviations from fundamentals are a positive function of 
past asset price changes: 
*
1t t tq q b q −− = ∆           (17) 
Hence, via Eq. (17), the final expression for the optimal interest rate rule is: 
*
*
t t y t t tq q
i f f y f q qpipi
−
 = + + −         (18) 
                                                 
13
  See Appendix A.2 for more details. 
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where  [ ]
3 1 2
1
1
c Afpi β δ β
−
= −
+
 ,  
1
3 1 2
0yf
β
β δ β= >+  ,  *
3
3 1 2
0
q q
f ββ δ β− = ≥+ ,  are the respective 
interest rate weights on inflation, output and asset price misalignments from fundamentals. The 
‘Taylor principle’ implies that the inflation coefficient, fpi , should exceed the value of one, to 
ensure a real interest rate response that will lead to lower inflation14.   
   
3.1 Analysis of the results 
The rule for adjusting nominal interest rates shown in Eqs. (16) and (18), signifies a 
fundamental new result in the interest rates rules literature, since we show that the central bank 
should not only take into consideration inflation and output when setting interest rates, but should 
also react to asset price misalignments. Bean (2003) also assumes a wealth effects augmented 
demand curve in his analysis, but the results that he obtains for optimal policy differ significantly 
from the ones presented in this section. In particular, Bean finds no role for asset prices in the 
commitment and discretionary equilibrium.  Bean’s optimality conditions contain neither the 
policy instrument, nor anything to do with the demand side of the economy.  
In our results, however, the aggressiveness of the reaction to asset price misalignments 
depends upon the impact of wealth effects in aggregate demand. If there are significant wealth 
effects, 3 0β > , then the central bank should raise interest rates in response to increasing asset 
price misalignments ( * 0q qf − > ). Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2003) simulate a forward-looking 
variant of the macroeconomic model presented here, and find that a mild response to 
misalignments ( * 0.1q qf − = ) promotes overall macroeconomic stability. Such a pro-active 
response has also been advocated by Cecchetti et al (2000) using the Bernake and Gertler (1999) 
new keynesian sticky wages – financial accelerator model.  
                                                 
14
 As we show in Appendix A.3, this condition is consistent with A < 1. 
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A common feature in the aforementioned studies is that they assume, rather than derive, a 
rule for interest rate setting and then examine the effects on macroeconomic volatility from 
reacting or not reacting to asset prices. Our main focus however, was to show that in the context 
of optimal central bank behavior, asset price misalignments should be an element in the monetary 
authority’s feedback rule. Hence, this paper extends the literature that obtains analytical 
expressions for interest rates based upon optimization of the central banks’ objectives. The 
augmented Taylor rule depicted by Eq. (18) points out explicitly that the financial and real 
instability associated with growing financial imbalances should not be tolerated by the central 
bank.  
It is easy to show that the standard Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) can be obtained as a special 
case of our augmented rule in two cases. First, in the absence of a link between aggregate demand 
and asset prices, i.e. 3 0β = , there is no scope for monetary policy to react to asset prices 
( * 0q qf − = ), and the feedback rule which implements the optimal policy takes the form of a 
Taylor rule with interest rates being an increasing function of inflation and the output gap15.  
* *
t t y ti f f ypi pi= +           (19) 
where the inflation and output gap weights are given by:  *
2
1 cf capi β= − +  ,  
* 1
2
yf
β
β= . 
Second, if markets are efficient and actual asset prices are always equal to their intrinsic 
value, i.e. b = 0, there is no direct monetary policy reaction to asset prices. In this case, monetary 
policy takes into account asset prices, indirectly and with a lag, via their demand wealth effects. 
Considering, however, the empirical evidence in Section 2.1, EMH does not appear to hold since 
b > 0. This implies that a positive weight should be applied to asset price misalignments.  
                                                 
15
 The policy rule in Eq. (19) is an direct explicit instrument rule since it provides a formula for the setting of policy 
instrument that specifies feedback only from predetermined target variables ( ,t typi ), without involving any 
‘intermediate target’ variables.  
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In order to further examine the impact of asset prices on the interest rate setting behavior 
of the central bank, we calculate the elasticity of the reaction coefficients in Eq. (18) with respect 
to the magnitude of wealth effects, 3β . The results, presented in Table 2 bellow, lead to 
Propositions 1 to 3. 
    [Table 2 about here] 
 
Proposition 1: The stronger the wealth effect, 3β , the smaller is the optimal interest rate weight 
on inflation.  
 
Proof:  Since 21 3 1 2,  ( ) 0δ β δ β+ > , c < 0 , A<1, it is implied that: 3 0fpi β∂ ∂ < . 
 
Proposition 2: The stronger the wealth effect, 3β , the smaller is the optimal interest rate weight 
on output gap.  
 
Proof:  Since 21 1 3 1 2,  ,  ( ) 0β δ β δ β+ > , it is implied that: 3 0yf β∂ ∂ < . 
 
Thus, when the role of capital markets as creator of wealth and collateral is taken into 
account, the magnitude of the inflation related-interest rate adjustment should be smaller. This 
does not imply that the Central Bank intervenes less frequently. In fact, if the true data generation 
process for aggregate demand is given by the augmented IS, Eq. (2), then monetary policy may 
have to be more frequently adjusted. Proposition 1 suggests that as wealth effects build up, a too 
aggressive interest rate response to inflation will lead to recession and will threaten the price 
stability objective.  In addition, Proposition 2 calls for a less pronounced response to the output 
gap in the presence of significant correlation between asset prices and aggregate demand.   
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Proposition 3: The stronger the wealth effect, 3β , the larger is the optimal interest rate weight 
on asset price misalignments from fundamentals.  
 
Proof:  Since 22 3 1 2,  ( ) 0β β δ β+ > , it is implied that: * 3 0q qf β−∂ ∂ > . 
 
The intuition and policy implications of Propositions 1 and 2 become clearer when 
considered in combination with Proposition 3. In essence, if aggregate demand is affected by the 
evolution of asset prices then monetary authorities should include asset price misalignments in 
their optimal feedback rule and there should be a change in the distribution of the relevant 
interest rate weights. Particularly, the interest rate weight on inflation and output decreases while 
the weight attached to asset price misalignments increases. This allows asset prices to be 
considered as an element of the authorities’ reaction function without necessarily implying 
overall tighter, than before, policy since the response to inflation and output will be less 
aggressive. In other words, our optimal analysis results imply that first, asset price misalignments 
should have an independent role and not only be considered as instruments to help forecast 
output and inflation; and second, there should be a shift in the magnitude of reaction, away from 
the traditional variables, i.e. inflation and the output gap, and towards a direct response to 
financial imbalances. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 Although there is still no widespread agreement among economists on whether central 
banks should explicitly target asset price inflation, in addition to conventional consumer price 
targets, a vast consensus that emerges states that the financial-market channel plays an important 
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role in the transmission of the monetary policy. Our aim in this paper is to examine how the 
conduct of monetary policy is affected by the dynamic evolution of asset prices. Starting from 
these considerations, we build a backward-looking structural macro model where asset price 
fluctuations have an impact on aggregate demand and consequently on inflation. A crucial 
property of our model is that the asset market is not necessarily efficient, thereby generating 
deviations between actual asset prices and their fundamental value. In order to construct the 
optimal interest rate rule, we assume that the central bank solves a stochastic control problem to 
minimise intertemporally the variance of the output gap and inflation.  
 The derived optimal policy rule conditions the monetary policy instrument not only on 
inflation and demand pressures, as standard in the Taylor rule literature, but also on financial 
imbalances, as represented by asset price misalignments from fundamentals. The magnitude of 
the interest rate reaction depends, among other factors, on the relative importance of wealth 
effects for aggregate demand. The response to deviations from fundamentals becomes more 
aggressive as wealth effects build up, while the reaction to inflation and the output gap becomes 
less pronounced. The derived augmented Taylor rule, nests the standard Taylor rule as a special 
case. When there is no difference between actual and intrinsic asset value (Efficient Market 
Hypothesis holds) and/or when there are no aggregate demand wealth effects, then the interest 
rate should respond to inflation and demand pressures only.  
 Thus, our main contribution is to extend the optimal monetary policy literature towards 
recognizing that, in the presence of wealth effects and inefficient capital markets, monetary 
authorities should grant an independent role to asset price misalignments and not only regard 
them as instruments to forecast inflation and output. Future work should consider an open 
economy model, where the firms’ financing and the households’ capital gains derive not only 
from domestic but also from foreign capital markets. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1:GMM Estimates of Eq. (3) 
 
 UK 
1966:4-2001:4 
USA 
1958:4-2002:3 
1δ  0.024 ** 0.016 * 
2δ             1.39 *** 1.54 ** 
b
 
0.45 *** 0.57 *** 
S.E. Regression 0.069 0.057 
J-Stat. 0.06 0.09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.48 0.50 
 
Note:  
 
1   Estimates are obtained by GMM estimation with correction for MA(4) autocorrelation. Two-stage least 
squares estimation is employed to obtain the initial estimates of the optimal weighting matrix.  
2   The instruments used are a constant and lags 1 to 6 of the change in: nominal short term interest rates, inflation, 
output gap, and real stock prices. 
3   J-stat denotes the test statistic for overidentifying restrictions.  
4   *, **, *** indicate level of significance of  10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Table 2: Partial derivatives of interest rate reaction coefficients with respect to wealth effect 
parameter, 3β  
 
f  3f β∂ ∂  
fpi  1 2
3 1 2
(1 ) 0( )
c A δ
β δ β
−
<
+
   
yf  1 1 2
3 1 2
0( )
β δ
β δ β− <+   
*q q
f
−
 
2
2
3 1 2
0( )
β
β δ β >+  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A1 
The first order condition that yields the optimal response is: 
( ) 0t
t
V pi
ϕ
∂
=
∂
 ⇔  2 ' 1( ) ( ) 0t t t ta a aE Vµ ϕ pi β pi ++ + + =         (A1.1) 
We employ the envelope theorem in order to derive an expression for ' 1( )t tE V pi + : 
2 21
1 1 12( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t
t
dV E y V dpi pi µ β pi pi
pi + + +
∂
 = + + ∂
  ⇔  
' '1 1 1
1 1 1( ) ( )t t tt t t t t t t
t t t
yV d E y V dpi pipi pi pi µ β pi pi
pi pi pi
+ + +
+ + +
 ∂ ∂ ∂
= + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
   ⇔  
' '
1 1( ) ( )t t t tV E Vpi pi β pi+ + = +  
Using (2) we obtain: 
' '
1( ) ( )t t t t tV a E Vpi pi ϕ β pi += + +             (A1.2) 
Multiplying (A1.2) by  and adding it to (A1.1) we get:  
'( )t taV pi µϕ= −               
If we multiply this expression by  lead it by one period and take expectations based in 
information at time t we get: ' 1 1( ) [ ]t t t taE V Eβ pi µβ ϕ+ += − . 
Thus, (A1.1) can be re-written as: 
2
1( ) [ ] 0t t t ta a Eµ ϕ pi µβ ϕ ++ + − =  ⇔   
12 2 [ ]t t t t
a E
a a
µβϕ pi ϕ
µ µ +
   
= − + 	  	+ +
  
 
           (A1.3) 
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Appendix A2 
The quadratic equation whose solution gives the optimal c value is: 
2 2( ) ( ) 0a c a c aµβ µβ µ+ − − − =            (A2.1) 
The two roots of (A2.1) are given by 
2 2 2 2 2 4 2 22 2 2
2
a a a a
c
a
µβ µ µ β µβ µ β µ µ
µβ
− + + ± + − + + +
=        (A2.2) 
Recalling that according to Eq. (2) inflation is given by:  
1 1 1( )t t t t t t ta a cpi pi ϕ ω pi pi ω+ + += + + = + + ⇔ 1 1 1(1 )t t ta cpi pi ω+ += + +  
Therefore, stability of the inflation process requires that  
 1 1ac+ < ⇔ 1 1 1ac− < + < ⇔ 2 0c
a
−
< <           (A2.3) 
Since a  > 0 it implies that only the negative c-root is accepted. 
 
Appendix A3 
The inflation parameter in the interest rate reaction function, fpi , has to be greater than one in 
order to satisfy the stability condition that real rates increase in response to inflation, with higher 
values implying a more aggressive response: 
[ ]
3 1 2
1
1 1
c Afpi β δ β
−
= − >
+
          (A3.1) 
This condition can be re-expressed as: 
[ ]
3 1 2
1
0
c A
β δ β
−
<
+
          (A3.2) 
As we showed in Appendix A2, only negative values of parameter c are accepted. Since 
3 1 2 0β δ β+ > , it is implied that: 
 1 0  1A A− > ⇔ <           (A3.3) 
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